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This paper examines the importance of portfolio-flow volatility 
a s  a determinant of the demand for intemational reserves over 
the 1980-99 period. Using panel data. we find that portfolio-flow 
volatility significantly raises the level of reserve holdings. 
Especially reserve accumulation is most sensitive to the volatility 
of portfolio balance (net flows). Capital account liberalization has 
increased uncertainty in the world economy, thereby making 
open economies more vulnerable to international financial crises. 
The regression results imply that monetary authorities have 
accumulated more precautionary reserve balances against 
increased uncertainty in portfolio flows as capital account 
Iiberalization progresses. As in previous studies, real openness is 
an important explanatory factor in determining the demand for 
reserves. 
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Precautionary demand 
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Many governments still jzidge the adequacy of their [international] 
reserves to the value of imports. But a reserve goal of "six months 
of imports" ignores the fact that currency crises are about capital 
flows, not trading financing. What matters is the udue of reserves 
relative to the amount of the currency that speculators m@ht sell 
when the county's fundamental economic conditions do not wwrant 
a currency decline. 
Feldstein (1999, p. 16) 
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I. Motivation 
Singapore and Taiwan held the largest international reserves 
leading up to the 1997 Asian financial crisis, and they were the 
least affected by its speculative pressures. Hardest hit were 
countries, such as Korea, with inadequate holdings of international 
reserves. Since the crisis Korea has built up large stockpiles of 
reserves and has become the world's fourth largest reserve holder 
today. 
This state of affairs is closely associated with two trends of the 
1990s in the international economy that may affect the determi- 
nants of reserve holdings. The first one is that capital mobility 
across countries becomes greater as more countries liberalize their 
capital accounts and remove capital controls. The second is that 
more countries face currency and financial crises with the 
increasing frequency of speculative attacks. In this paper, we seek: 
to identify empirically whether these trends have affected central 
bank reserve holdings. 
Previous studies on the demand for international reseives are 
based on the buffer stoclr model introduced by Heller (1966) and 
Frenlrel and Jovanovic (1981). The model suggests that a nation's 
optimal holdings of reserves are associated with iwo costs: The first 
is the opportunity cost of holding reserves. The second is the 
expected macroeconomic adjustment cost incurred in the absence of 
reserves. The adjustment cost is defined generally as the output 
forgone by taking expenditure-reducing or -switching policies to 
generate the external payments surplus necessary for reserve 
accumulation. A higher level of reserves reduces the probability of 
having to make adjustments and thus lowers the expected cost of 
adjustment. But this benefit comes at the cost of higher foregone 
earnings, which is the opportunity cost of holding reserves. At the 
optimal level of reserve holdings the sum of these iwo costs are 
minimized. 
As a result, the main determinants of the demand for reserves 
used by previous empirical studies have been associated with the 
adjustment cost, the opportunity cost, and reserve volatility.' Since 
For example, see Heller and Kahn (1978), Edwards (1983), Frenkel(1983). 
and Lizondo and Mathieson (1987). Another view is the monetary approach 
to balance of payments where the disequilibrium of money market reflects 
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the international financial crises in the 1990s, however, empirical 
studies on reserve holdings have added other determinants or used 
new measures of the explanatory variables employed in the 
previous studies (Lane and Burke 2001; Aizenman and Marion 
2002, 2004; Flood and Marion 2002). L,ane and Burke(2001) use a 
large number of potential determinants of reserves in their 
empirical study. Their empirical results suggest that trade openness 
is the most important factor in explaining cross-country variation in 
reserve accumulation. The other statistically significant variables are 
financial development and the level of total external debt. 
Aizenman and Marion (2002a. b) interpret the build-up of large 
international reserves in some Asian countries after the 1997 
financial crisis as representing precautionary holdings.2 Traditional 
determinants suggested by the buffer stocli model cannot fully 
explain the behavior of precautionary reserve holdings. The 
additional variables that may lead to large precautionary reserves 
are sovereign risk, costly tax collection to cover fiscal liabilities, and 
loss aversion against a future crisis. On the other hand, countries 
with high discount rates, political instability or political corruption 
may hold smaller precautionary balances. Aizenman and Marion's 
estimated results support the idea that political corruption and 
instability significantly reduce reserve holdings. 
Mood and Marion (2002) use a new measure of reserve volatility 
and re-estimate Frenkel and Javanovic's (1981) model with more 
recent panel data for 36 developed and developing countries over 
the 1980-97 period. Traditional volatility measures used in the 
previous studies have been the volatility of export receipts or actual 
reserve volatility. The new measure of reserve volatility, called 
fundamentals volatility, corrects positive or negative slrewness to 
the reserve increment measure that can occur after financial and 
changes in international reserves. See Frenkei(l983). Edwards (1984), 
Elbadawi (1990). Ford and Huang (19941, and Huang and Shen (1999). Also 
see Bahmani-Qskooee and Brown (2002) for a recent review of the literature 
on international reserves. 
2Aizenman and Lee (2005) present a model of financial intermediation 
and adjustment to liquidity shocks, where hoarding international reserves 
emerges as part of the optimal financial intermediation. Using cross-section 
data of 53 countries for the period of 1980-2000. they reconfirm that 
precautionary demand is consistent with high levels of reserves. Using the 
precautionary approach, Aizenman, Lee, and Rhee (2004) investigate changes 
in reserve holdings in Korea in the aftermath of 1997-8 crisis. 
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currency crises. The estimated coefficients on the new measure of 
volatility are statistically significant, but their sizes become much 
smaller than those of Frenkel and Jovanovic(l981). Their 
conclusion is that the buffer stoclr model of reserve holdings works 
a s  well in an  era of increased exchange-rate flexibility and high 
capital mobility a s  it did when capital was less mobile. 
Our study is close to I'lood and Marion (2002), but it uses 
portfolio-flow volatility as an alternative volatility measure.3 The 
purpose of this paper is to test whether portfolio-flow volatility is a 
significant determinant of the demand for international reserves. 
The rationale for using this volatility measure is that the extent of 
portfolio-flow volatility rather than trade flow volatility should 
matter for reserve holdings in the world of high capital mobility 
associated with capital account liberalization. Moreover, porffolio 
flows, not trade flows, have been relevant to recent currency and 
financial crises. 
We describe the empirical specification and data in section 11, 
and analyze the regression results in section 111. The final section 
summarizes the paper's main findings. 
II. Model and Data 
A. The Empirical Specijication 
To analyze the effect of portfolio-flow volatility on the demand for 
international reserves, we set up an  estimating equation a s  follows: 
where RES stands for the reserves/GDP ratio, VOL is the volatility 
of portfolio flows. GDP is the Gross Domestic Product, and OPEN is 
the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP. The subscripts, i and t, 
denote country i and year t, respectively. 
3F100d and Marion(2002) concern about the skewness of reserve 
increments induced by periodic adjustments by the reserve authority, which 
may violate the assumption of Frenlcel and Javanovic (1981) that reserves 
follow a Wiener process up until they hit the upper barrier. But we assume 
that the reserve authority does not set such barrier for porffolio flows. Thus 
the problem of skewness is ignored when we calculate portfolio-flow 
volatility. 
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Reserve holdings should increase with the volatility of portfolio 
flows if they are to be held under a precautionary motive in an 
economy where financial openness is high. So we expect P1>0. 
GDP measures the country's size or standard of living. Reserve 
holdings should increase with the size of international transactions; 
so GDP may be positively correlated with reserves. However, a 
larger country is less subject to speculative attack and financial 
crises so that it can survive with smaller reserves relative to its 
GDP. Thus, the sign of pz is not unambiguous. 
Reserve holdings should be associated with the vulnerability of 
real external shocks such as terms-of-trade shocks. Since an open 
economy that trades more with other economies could face more 
frequent and larger adjustment costs, real openness may be 
positively correlated with reserve holdings. On the other hand, 
Heller (1966) uses the marginal propensity to import (rn) as an 
openness measure and adopts a Keynesian view where the 
adjustment cost for an economy is equal to the inverse of its rn. 
He concludes that greater openness, by reducing the adjustment 
cost, would be related to lower reserve holdings. Thus, the sign of 
P3 is not certain either. 
In contrast to Flood and Marion (2002), we exclude the oppor- 
tunity cost a s  an explanatory variable in (1). As Aizenman and 
Marion (2002, 2004) admit, previous studies have found that it is 
an insignificant explanatory factor.* There are few reliable proxies 
for the opportunity cost variable. Moreover, interest-rate data have 
not been available especially for many developing countries. 
B. Data 
The data set consists of reserve information from the period 
1980-99 for 46 countries, listed in Table 1. The countries are 
chosen based on the availability of reserve data and other variables 
for estimation. The total reserves minus gold (.lL.DZF) series in 
U.S. Dollars from the IFS CD-ROM from the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF 2001) are used as a measure of international reserves 
  he exceptions are Edwards (1985), Landell-Mills (19891, and Ben-Bassat 
and Gottlieb (1992). In their literature survey, Bahmani-Oskooee and Brown 
(2002) conclude that the measure of opportunity cost is significant when 
countries are considered individually, but insignificant when data are 
pooled. 
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TABLE 1 
COUNTRY LIST 
1 ARGENTINA 1 7  HUNGARY 33 PHILIPPINES 
2 AUSTRALIA 18 ICELAND 3 4  PORTUGAL 
3 AUSTRIA 19 IRELAND 35 RUSSIA 
4 BELARUS 2 0  ISRAEL 36 SLOVAK REPUBLIC 
5 BRAZIL 2 1  ITALY 3 7  SLOVENIA 
6 BULGARIA 2 2  JAPAN 38 SOUTH AFRICA 
7 CANADA 2 3  KOREA 39 SPAIN 
8 CHILE 2 4  LA'llrLA 4 0  SRI LANKA 
9 COLOMBIA 2 5  LITHUANIA 4 1  SWEDEN 
10 CZECH REPUBLIC 2 6  MALTA 4 2  THAILAND 
11 DENMARK 2 7  MEXICO 4 3  TURKEY 
1 2  ESTONIA 2 8  NETHERLANDS 4 4  UNITED KINGDOM 
13 FINLAND 2 9  NEW ZEALAND 4 5  UNITED STATES 
14 FRANCE 30 NORWAY 4 6  VENEZUELA. REP. BOL. 
15 GERMANY 31 PAI'UA NEW GUINEA 
16 GUATEMALA 3 2  PERU 
a t  the end of the period. The gold series in ounces is from the IFS 
CD-ROM and is multiplied by 35 (=gold in SDR), and then 
converted to U.S. Dollars using the end-of-period $/SDR exchange 
rate (1 1 1. .AA.ZF) following Flood and Marion (2002). Portfolio-flow 
data are the quarterly portfolio investment assets (78BFDZF) and 
the liabilities (78BGDZF) series from the IFS CD-ROM. Import, 
export, and GDP are measured in current U.S. Dollars and are 
taken from the World Development Indicators CD-ROM from the 
World Bank (200 1). 
As a robustness check, we use four types of portfolio-flow 
volatility: (a) Liability, (b) asset, (c) balance, and (d) sum. To get the 
volatiliiy of portfolio liability and portfolio asset, we use the 
standard deviation of each country's current and past iwo years' 
quarterly portfolio-liability (asset) data. For example, to get the 
1980 portfolio-liability (asset) volatility, we use the standard 
deviation of quarterly portfolio-liability (asset) data from the first 
quarter of 1978 to the fourth quarter of 1980 divided by GDP in 
1980. Portfolio-balance volatility where balance is defined a s  
portfolio liability minus portfolio asset is obtained in the same way 
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Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Foreign Reserves (Million USD) 417 22.628.43 30,080.99 96.06 286,916.00 
Volatility of Portfolio Liability 
Volatility of Portfolio Assets 
Volatility of Portfolio Balance 
Volatility of Portfolio Sum 
GDP (Million USD) 
Per Capita GDP (USD) 
Openness 
Gold (Million USD) 
Source: Authors' calculation from I F 3  CD-ROM, IMF(2001) and W 1  
CD-ROM, World Bank (2001). 
as described above. Portfolio-sum volatility is calculated a s  the sum 
of portfolio-liability volatility and portfolio-asset volatility. Summary 
statistics for the variables used in the regression are listed in Table 
2. 
HIH. Empirical Evidence: PorIcfolio-1F'Iow Volatility and 
Reserve Holdings 
Using pooled data, we estimate (1) by OLS (ordinary least 
squares). The dependent variable is the natural log of foreign 
reserves excluding gold scaled by GDP. The regression results for 
the four types of portfolio-flow volatility are shown in Table 3.  All 
types of portfolio-flow volatility significantly raise the level of reserve 
holdings. The estimated coefficient on asset volatility is positive and 
significant a t  lo%, but  the other volatility measures have positive 
coefficients at the 1% significance level. The coefficient of portfolio- 
balance volatility has  the highest va.lue, 0.167, while that of 
portfolio asset volatility is the smallest value, 0.069. This means 
that when portfolio-balance volatility increases by 1% the reserves/ 
GDP ratio increases by 0.167%. This result is consistent with our 
presumption that monetary authorities' reserve accumulation could 
be sensitive most to portfolio-balance volatility, but least to portfolio 
asset (outflows) volatility. 
The estimated coefficients on GDP are all negative and significant 
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PORTFOLIO-FLOW VOLATILI'TY AND DEMAND FOR FOREIGN RESERVES 
Dependent Variable ln(RES) 
Estimation Method Pooled OLS 









Adjusted R' 0.48 
No. of obs. 417 
Asset Balance Sum 
Notes: 1) RES stands for the reserves/GDP ratio, VOL is the volatility of 
portfolio flows, GDP is the Gross Domestic Product, and OPEN is 
the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP. 
2) *, **, and *** denote significance at the lo%, 5%. and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
3) Newey and West's (1987) heteroscedasticity- and autocorrelation- 
consistent covariance matrix assuming a lag length of one is 
used for standard errors. 
a t  1%.5 Larger countries may need larger reserves for international 
transactions, but actually hold smaller reserves relative to their 
economic size. The results imply that precautionary reserve hold- 
ings are less important for larger countries. 
All the coefficients on real openness (OPEN) are positive and 
significant at 1%. Countries more open to external trade have more 
chances to face external shocks and thus demand greater 
international reserves. Lane and Burke (2001) also confirm that 
trade openness is the most important determinant of cross-county 
variation in reserve accumulation. In their extended empirical work, 
Flood and Marion (2002) show that real openness is positively 
Lane and Burke (2001) use population size and per capita GDP here. In 
their regression results, population size significantly lowers reserve holdings 
relative to GDP while the estimated coefficients for per capita GDP are 
positive but statistically insignificant. On the other hand, the coefficients of 
both variables are positive and significant for Aizenman and Marion (2002, 
2004) where the dependent variable is defined as the ratio of reserves to 
external debt or to M2. 
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FOREIGN RESERVES INCLUDING GOLD 
Dependent Variable In(RES) 
-- 
Estimation Method Pooled OLS 
Portfolio Volatility Type 
Constant 
Adjusted R~ 














































Notes: 1) *, **, and *** denote significance a t  the 10%. 5%, and 1% levels. 
respectively. 
2) Newey and West's (1987) heteroscedasticity- and autocorrelation- 
consistent covariance matrix assuming a lag length of one is 
used for standard errors. 
correlated with reserve holdings, too.6 
Flood and Marion (2002) assert that gold should be included in 
the reserves measure. As a robustness check, we use international 
reserves including gold and re-estimate (1). The results, shown in 
Table 4, indicate that all the regression results are pretty robust 
when international reserves including gold are used, although the 
coefficient for each of the volatilities decreases sIighUy and asset 
volatility loses its significance. 
We are also interested in whether the significance of portfolio-flow 
volatility varies depending upon estimating periods. Compared with 
the 1990s. capital accounts were less open in the 1980s. 
international capital mobility was lower, and financial crises were 
less frequent. Table 5 presents the portfolio-balance estimation 
results for the 1980s and 1990s. As expected, the coefficient on 
volatility is positive and significant in the 1990s, but insignificant 
in the 1980s. The role of real openness in determining reserve 
"They also show a positive relationship between financial openness and 
reserve holdings. We tried to add financial openness a s  an explanatory 
variable, but its estimated coefricients were not significant. The main reason 
would be that it is highly correlated with portfolio-flow volatility. 
2 08 SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
TABLE 5
PORTFOLIO-BALANCE VOLATILITY AND DEMAND FOR FOREIGN RESERVES: 
BY PERIOD 
Dependent Variable In(RES) 
Estimation Method Pooled OLS 






No. of obs. 137 280 
Source: Authors' calculation 
Notes: 1) *, **, and *** denote significance a t  the lo%, 5%. and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
2) Newey and West's (1987) heteroscedasticity- and autocorrelation- 
consistent covariance matrix assuming a lag length of one is 
used for standard errors. 
holdings is greater in the 1980s, and, importantly, the explanatory 
power increases with only two significant control variables, country 
size and openness. This implies that real trade impacts central 
bcmk reserve accumulation more in the 1980s than in the 1990s. 
Table 6 examines the case for two separate country groups, rich 
and poor countries. A rich country is defined as a country whose 
per capita GDP is greater than 10,000 U.S. Dollars in each 
observation.7 For the rich-country sample, the estimated coefficients 
of all portfolio-flow volatilities are significant at 1%. For the 
poor-country sample, on the other hand, real openness is the only 
variable that keeps its significance in determining the demand for 
international reserves. The coefficient of openness for poor countries 
is almost twice that for rich countries, Moreover, the adjusted 
7~ country belongs to a group of poor countries in some years, and the 
same country also belongs to the rich group in other years according to the 
variations of the per capita GDP. It may be more exact if the classification 
refers to high-income period and low-income period rather than rich 
countries and poor countries. 
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PORTFOLIO-FLow VOLATILITY AND DEMAND FOR FOREIGN RESERVES: 
BY RCH AND POOR COUNTRY 
Dependent Variable ln(RES) 
Estimation Method Pooled OLS 
Country Group Rich Country (Per Capita GDP>$10,000) 
Portfolio Volatility Type Liability Asset Balance Sum 
Constant 1.703*** 2.303*** 1.878*** 1.903*** 
(0.583) (0.603) (0.579) (0.575) 
ln(V0L) 0.136*** 0.151*** 0.176""" 0.174""" 
(0.042) (0.040) (0.043) (0.045) 
Adjusted R' 0.55 0.57 0.56 0.56 
No. of obs. 308 308 308 308 
Countrv Group Poor Countrv (Per Capita GDP< $10.000) 
Portfolio Volatility Type Liability Asset Balance Sum 
Constant -1.308 - 1.723* -0.898 -1.418 
(1.327) (0.989) (1.210) (1.266) 
In(V0L) 0.064 -0.016 0.116 0.063 
(0.096) (0.076) (0.088) (0.106) 
ln(GDfl -0.056 -0.059, -0.070 -0.048 
(0.100) (0.087) (0.099) (0.096) 
In(0PEN) 0.690X* 0.733*** 0.630** 0.704*"* 
(0.274) (0.247) (0.269) (0.266) 
Adjusted R" 0.27 0.26 0.28 0.27 
No, of obs. 101 I01 101 101 
Notes: 1) *, **. and *** denote significance a t  the 10%. 5%, and 1% levels. 
respectively. 
2) Newey and West's (1987) heteroscedasticity- and autocorrelation- 
consistent covariance matrix assuming a lag length of one is 
used for standard errors. 
coefficient of determination (8') is about 56% for the rich countries' 
reserve holdings, but only about 27% for poor countries. These 
results suggest that poor countries hold reserves mostly by the 
transactions motive and their capital accounts are less open than 
those of rich countries.8 l'hough Lane and Burke (2001) used 
'Correlation coefficient of log of per capita GDP and log of financial 
openness, which is defined as  the ratio of gross private capital flows to 
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TABLE 7 
PORTFOLIO-FLOW VOLATILITY AND DEMAND FOR FOREIGN RESERVES: 
INDIVIDUAL R NDOM EFFECTS 
De~endent Variable lnlRESl 









Adjusted R~ 0.84 
No. of obs. 417 
Asset Balance Sum 
Note: *. **, and *"* denote significance at the 10%. 5%. and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
export volatility a s  a volatility measure, they also confirmed that 
volatility lost its significance with wrong signs for their developing- 
country sample while openness remained a significant explanatory 
factor. 
As a methodology robustness check, we ran a regression with 
individual random effects. The results are listed in Table 7. 
Compared with the basic results in Table 3, the coefficients on 
portfolio-flow volatilities, with the exception of portfolio-asset 
volatility, are still highly significant, but they become smaller. 
Openness has a stronger effect on reserve holdings. However, the 
role of GDP significantly decreases, and the GDP coefficient 
becomes insignificant for two cases out of four. 
Lastly, a panel GMM method is used in Table 8. We use robust 
standard errors, which are heteroscedasticity- and autocorrelation- 
consistent up to a moving average of I lag via GMM. Instrumental 
variables used are constant, In VOL( - I) ,  In CLIP(- 1). In OPEN(- l ) ,  
and In OPEN(-2). Furthermore, we test the null hypothesis that the 
expected error is zero according to the J-statistic proposed by 
Hansen (1982). The null hypothesis cannot be rejected, meaning 
that the model specification is appropriate. The estimated results 
GDP, was 0.58. This supports the argument that in general capital 
accounts are less open in poor countries than in rich countries. 
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TABLE 8
PORTFOLIO-FLOW VOLATILITY AND DEMAND FOR FOREIGN RESERVES: 
PANEL GMM 
Dependent Variable ln(RES) 
Estimation Method Pooled OLS 
Portfolio Volatility Type Liability Asset. Balance Sum 
Constant 1.038* 0.720 1.470'&** 1.109* 
(0.61 1) (0.690) (0.552) (0.630) 
In(V0L) 0.129** 0.048 0.169*** 0.142** 
(0.053) (0.050) (0.048) (0.057) 
In(GDP) -0.246*** -0.251*** -0.269*** -0.253*** 
(0.038) (0.042) (0.038) (0.040) 
ln(0PEN) 0.349*** 0.376*** 0.288*** 0.320""" 
(0.010) (0.114) (0.096) (0.104) 
Adjusted R" 0.47 0.46 0.50 0.47 
No. of obs. 395 395 357 395 
J-Specification(1) 0.52 0.0009 0.40 0.34 
Significance Level of J 0.47 0.98 0.53 0.56 
Instrumental VariabIes Constant. InVOL(- l J .  InGDP(- 1). InOPEN(- lJ,  
InOPEN( - 2)  - 
Notes: 1) *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10% 5%. and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
2) Newey and West's (1987) heteroscedasticity- and autocorrelation- 
consistent covariance matrix assuming a lag length of one is 
used for standard errors. 
are very similar to the basic results in Table 3. The exception is 
that portfolio-asset volatility loses its significance. 
This paper has examined whether portfolio-flow volatility is an  
important determinant of the demand for international reserves over 
the last two decades. The regression results show that portfolio-flow 
volatility significantly raises the level of reserve holdings. The 
volatility of portfolio balance (net flows) turned out to be more 
sensitive than other types of portfolio flow volatility in determining 
reserve holdings. The results imply that monetaiy authorities have 
accumulated more precautionary reserve balances against increased 
volatility of capital flows a s  capital account liberalization progresses 
and more frequent international financial crises occur. We can 
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confirm this argument from the estimation results that porffolio- 
flow volatility loses its significance for the 1980s and for poor- 
country samples, for which capital account liberalization is limited. 
As in previous studies, real openness proved to be an  important 
explanatory factor in determining the demand for reserves. 
Recently researchers have tried to t.est whether capital account 
liberalization positively affects economic growth (for example, Edison 
et al. (2002)) and financial development (Chinn and Ito 2002). 
While beneficial in many respects, capital account liberalization has 
increased uncertainty, thereby malcing open economies more 
vulnerable to financial crises. 
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